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numbers killed by 
lawnmower with 
those killed by 
Jihadist terrorists, 
do NOT ‘highlight 
misunderstanding
s of risk’ or 
‘illuminate the 
bigger picture’. 
They do the 
exact opposite as 

















 Are lawnmowers a greater 
risk than terrorists? 
 
Norman Fenton and Martin Neil, 3 January 2018 
 
In December 2017 the Royal Statistical Society announced the 
winner of its “International Statistic of the Year”.  The citation1 
announced it as follows: 
 




This is the annual number of Americans killed, on average, 
by lawnmowers - compared to two Americans killed 
annually, on average, by immigrant Jihadist terrorists. 
 
The figure was highlighted in a viral tweet this year from Kim 
Kardashian in response to a migrant ban proposed by President 
Trump; it had originally appeared in a Richard Todd article for 
the Huffington Post. 
 
Todd’s statistics and Kardashian’s tweet successfully 
highlighted the huge disparity between (i) the number of 
Americans killed each year (on average) by ‘immigrant Islamic 
Jihadist terrorists’ and (ii) the far higher average annual death 
tolls among those ‘struck by lightning’, killed by ‘lawnmowers’, 
and in particular ‘shot by other Americans’. 
 
Todd and Kardashian’s use of these figures shows how 
everyone can deploy statistical evidence to inform debate and 
highlight misunderstandings of risk in people’s lives. 
 
Judging panel member Liberty Vittert said: 'Everyone on the 
panel was particularly taken by this statistic and its insight into 
risk - a key concept in both statistics and everyday life. When 
you consider that this figure was put into the public domain by 
Kim Kardashian, it becomes even more powerful because it 
shows anyone, statistician or not, can use statistics to illustrate 

















statistics do not 
include the 3000 
deaths on 9/11 
and also a 
number of other 






2009 attack at 
Fort Hood that 
killed 14 – carried 
out by a foreign-
born Jihadist – 
was for several 
years classified 




Based on the 
same time period 
the number of 
people killed in 
the USA from 
man-made 
climate change is 
zero. Using the 
same reasoning 




change risk is 
infinitesimally 










Jihad attacks on 
America   
 
 




Figure 1 Tweet by Kim Kardashian that earned "International Statistic of the 
Year" 2017 
 
While the announcement was met with enormous enthusiasm, 
one significant dissenter was Nassim Nicolas Taleb – a  well-
known expert on risk and ‘randomness’. He exposed a 
fundamental problem with the statistic, which he summed up in 



















The probability of 
being killed by a 
lawnmower in 





have lawns to 
mow. This 
illustrates another 
flaw in the RSS 
risk argument – it 
does not take 
account of 
different personal 
‘profiles’: if you 
do not own or 
use a lawnmower 
your risk of being 








have long tails 







is a small non-
zero probability of 
getting 2000 
fatalities from 
terrorist attacks in 
a single year in 
the USA. 
 
Indeed, rather than “inform debate and highlight 
misunderstandings of risk in people’s lives” as stated by the RSS, 
this example does exactly the opposite. It provides a highly 
misleading view of risk because it omits crucial causal information 
that explains the statistics observed. These are very different for 
the two different fatality numbers. One of the objectives of our 
book2 is to help readers understand how to see through such 
statistics and build models that incorporate the necessary causal 
context.  
 
Informally, Taleb’s argument is that there is a key difference 
between risks that are systemic, which can affect more than one 
person (such as a terrorist attack) and those that are not (such 
as using a lawnmower) which can be considered random. The 
chances that the number of people who die from a non-systemic 
risk, like using a lawnmower, will double next year are extremely 
unlikely. But this cannot be said about the number of people dying 
from systemic risks like terrorist attacks and epidemics. The latter 
can be ‘multiplicative’ whereas the former cannot. It is impossible 
for a thousand people in New York City to die from using 
lawnmowers next year, but it is not impossible for a thousand to 
die there from terrorist attacks.  
 
Systemic and non-systemic risks have very different ‘probability 




Figure 3 Comparing the probability distributions of number of fatalities per year 
                                                          
2 Fenton, N.E. and M. Neil, Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis with Bayesian Networks.  CRC Press, ISBN: 


























In the lawnmower 
case Fred and 
Jane are killed by 
different 
lawnmowers. 







(such as a 
controller bug 







Using the number of deaths per year to compare different types of ‘risk’ 
fails to consider the range of factors that affect the true risk to particular 
individuals or groups. A person who does not use a lawnmower cannot 
be killed by one, whereas there is a greater risk to gardeners; similarly, 
residents of major cities are at greater risk from terrorists than residents 
who live in the countryside.  Crucially, there are also causal factors 
that explain the number of terrorist deaths that need to be considered 
alongside the basic statistics: terrorist cells can be responsible for 
multiple deaths in a single attack, and also multiple attacks. Hence, 
unlike lawnmower deaths, the deaths in terrorist attacks are related by 
a common cause other than simply the artificial risk classification 
(lawnmower or terrorist attack). Moreover, because as Taleb says ‘your 
lawnmower is not trying to kill you’, there are extreme security 
measures in place to stop terrorist attacks. If these were removed the 




Figure 4 Causal view of lawnmower versus terrorist attack deaths 
 
These types of causal influences and relations (summarised in Figure 
4) are the focus of much of our book (new edition out in Sept 2018): 
 
Fenton, N.E. and M. Neil, Risk Assessment and Decision 
Analysis with Bayesian Networks.  CRC Press, ISBN: 
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